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Gender Specialization of Skill Acquisition∗
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Abstract
This paper presents a model that can account for the gender specialization of skill acquisi-
tion in the presence of competitive matching. In particular we show that when the comparative
advantage in nonmarket domestic activities belongs to women, an incentive arises for them to in-
tentionally degrade the market value of acquired skills in order to secure gains from the marriage
market. We then show that this incentive can be excessively strong and gives rise to the emergence
of an inefficient asymmetric equilibrium where women concentrate excessively on acquiring skills
that do not lead to higher wages in the labor market. The analysis reveals why policy interventions
such as affirmative action programs or equal employment opportunity laws that directly subsidize
the acquisition of skills for women would not be effective in closing the gender earnings gap in the
long run, and instead suggests that extensive family policies are generally more effective in this
regard.
KEYWORDS: gender specialization, human capital investment, marriage, intrahousehold bar-
gaining, affirmative action
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comments. We are also deeply indebted to Co-Editor Albert Ma for many detailed comments and
suggestions that vastly improved the paper. Any remaining errors are our own. The second author
acknowledges financial support from JSPS (Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C) 19530224).
1 Introduction
Personal attributes often dictate the way people acquire skills. Among them,
gender in particular seems to be a crucial determinant of the pattern of skill
acquisition. Even in countries where the gender differences in educational at-
tainment no longer exist,1 in general the pattern of skill acquisition has been
highly segregated by gender. A pattern consistently observed is that women
tend to invest in skills that, on average, do not lead to high wages in the
labor market whereas men acquire skills that are necessary for high-income
occupations. In the US, for instance, women have been underrepresented
in high-income college majors such as engineering and business, at least un-
til recently: they made up only 9% of all business majors and 0.8% of all
engineering majors in 1971, yet 74% of all education and foreign language
literature majors (US Census Bureau, 2004–2005, No.285). As the salaries
of engineering and business graduates were 43% and 13% higher, respec-
tively, than those of humanities graduates in 1975 (US Census Bureau, 1980,
No.283),2 the differences in college majors account for a substantial part
of gender wage gaps (Eide and Grogger, 1995; Brown and Corcoran, 1997;
Altonji and Blank, 1999).3 Apparently, this asymmetric pattern of skill ac-
quisition is not an isolated phenomenon in the US. In Japan, besides the
gender difference in college major choices, a substantial portion of women
attend two-year junior colleges that place a clear emphasis on the acquisition
of domestic skills such as home economics or domestic science.4
To examine this gender specialization of skill acquisition (hereafter re-
ferred to simply as the gender specialization), our paper presents a theoreti-
cal framework that can account for this pattern and examines its welfare and
policy implications. To this end, the first part of the paper is concerned with
efficiency properties, asking whether the gender specialization ever under-
mines social welfare, and, if so, in what ways. The answer to this question is
not necessarily straightforward as the gender specialization could be a result
of the efficient division of labor within households. As Becker (1991) most
notably suggested, the two parties in a household generally do not need to
1In the US, for instance, the gender differences in educational attainment had almost
disappeared by the 1970s (Corcoran and Duncan, 1979).
2The figures are the initial monthly salaries offered to new graduates.
3In particular, Brown and Corcoran, (1997) show that 0.08 to 0.09 of a 0.2 gender wage
gap is caused by differences in college majors.
4The gender difference in the college enrollment rate had disappeared in Japan by
the late 1980s. However, of those women attending college, about 60% attended junior
colleges, whereas the corresponding figure for men was only 5% (Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan, 2004).
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acquire the same set of skills: if men invest in skills designed for market
activities, it is often more beneficial for women to acquire skills designed for
domestic activities.5 In order to reap the benefit of role specialization, the
pattern of skill acquisition could be, and, perhaps to some extent, should
be segregated by gender. Although Becker analyzed a situation where the
investments take place after marriage, subsequent studies such as Echevarria
and Merlo (1999), Hadfield (1999), Engineer and Welling (1999) and Ishida
(2003) confirmed that Becker’s original insight still holds in various settings
even if the investments take place before marriage.
Although these studies are certainly suggestive, there is an important
caveat to their results: their models assume either that agents are homoge-
nous before investment decisions or that the matching is random.6 These
assumptions may trivialize a critical aspect of marriage formation because
the matching pattern in the marriage market is often positively assortative.
The main purpose of the paper is to incorporate this competitive aspect of
marriage formation and explore its consequences and implications. This ad-
dition proves to be critical, as it introduces a new dimension to the problem,
i.e., the trade-off between the marriage and labor markets. More impor-
tantly, we argue that this trade-off distorts incentives, especially on the part
of women, and ultimately leads to inefficient asymmetric equilibria where
women concentrate excessively on the acquisition of nonmarketable domestic
skills.
The intuition behind this inefficiency result is as follows. With marriage
arises the benefit of role specialization. As full-time jobs normally require
full-time effort, it is often optimal for at least one member of the household
to focus exclusively on market activities. In many cases, it is women who
expend more resources on domestic activities as they often possess a com-
parative advantage in them (Lazear and Rosen, 1990; Echevarria and Merlo,
1999). Provided that the productivity in domestic activities does not depend
strongly on the level of accumulated marketable skills, this implies that at
least some fraction of women’s skills must be wasted when they are married.
5Throughout the paper, the term “domestic activities” is used to broadly refer to
various nonmarket activities such as housekeeping, childbearing and child rearing.
6The random matching assumption implies that marriages are formed based on exoge-
nous (noneconomic) factors: Engineer andWelling (1999) referred to this as the “true-love”
criteria. In this paper, we take the opposite stance, that marriages are formed on the basis
of purely endogenous (mostly economic) factors. These views clearly represent the two
extreme points of the spectrum, and reality must lie somewhere in between. It should be
noted that our main results hold even when exogenous factors play some role in marriage
formation, as long as endogenous factors are sufficiently important.
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This fact gives rise to subtle strategic interactions when the total surplus
is divided through intrahousehold (Nash) bargaining, as is often assumed
in the recent literature.7 Because women with higher earnings potentially
have stronger bargaining power (more precisely, higher threat points) but do
not increase the total surplus of the household sufficiently, they tend to be
perceived as less desirable as marital partners from the viewpoint of men.
As a consequence, a serious trade-off arises for women: while they can raise
their wages by acquiring more marketable skills, this could actually work to
their disadvantage in the marriage market because their bargaining power be-
comes excessively strong.8 This “fear of success” seriously distorts women’s
incentives and leads them to invest inefficiently in an attempt to reduce their
threat points.9
Given that gender specialization can be inefficient from the social point of
view, the second part of this paper focuses on policies to fix this problem. To
this end, it is important to note that whether this inefficient asymmetric equi-
librium arises depends crucially on the magnitude of the cost of the domestic
activities required to sustain a household. Women with more marketable
skills are less preferred by men when the cost of domestic activities is large
and women need to devote a significant fraction of resources to domestic ac-
tivities once they are married. As the burden of domestic activities becomes
less significant and the opportunity cost of marriage decreases, there may be
a symmetric equilibrium where the gender difference in the pattern of skill
acquisition disappears.10 Thus, the present analysis reveals that the source
of the inefficiency lies in the asymmetric cost structure of domestic activities
7In many economic analyses, households are considered as the minimum decision-
making unit: it is typically assumed that each household acts as a single decision-making
unit and that each member of a household earns the same level of utility. Recent evidence
seems to indicate that this pooled income approach is not consistent empirically (Thomas,
1990; Browning et al., 1994; Chiappori et al., 2002).
8Thus, our focus is on endogenously determined threat points in the bargaining process.
Another strand of literature focuses on endogenously determined bargaining shares. See
Basu (2006) and Iyigun and Walsh (2007a) for this approach.
9The term “fear of success” was suggested by a referee. We thank him/her for this
intuitive expression.
10We argue that this is roughly consistent with the recent trend in the US. As stated, in
the US in 1971, women made up only 9% of all business majors and 0.8 % of all engineering
majors. In 2002, these figures had risen to 50% and 19%, respectively. The same trends
can be observed for the gender differences in occupational choices. Black and Juhn (2000,
Table 1) showed that the fraction of women in high-wage occupations, defined as the top
20% of jobs in terms of male wages, increased from 8% in 1967 to 24% by 1997. Changes
in the pattern of skill acquisition have narrowed the gender earnings gap (Blau and Kahn,
1992; O’Neill and Polachek, 1993).
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and the consequent earnings gap between single and married women.
Subsidizing women to acquire skills is not effective because such a policy
benefits both single and married women equally and hence has no impact
on the pattern of investment. An income transfer program that compensates
married women for the opportunity cost of marriage (or alternatively the lost
market income) is more effective as it can effectively reduce the earnings gap
between single and married women. As a consequence, we argue that policy
interventions such as paid maternity leave, childcare benefits or subsidies to
nursery schools are much more effective in closing the gender gap in the long
run than affirmative action programs or equal employment opportunity laws
that directly subsidize the acquisition of skills for all women.
To show its empirical relevance, we would like to note that this policy
implication is roughly consistent with what has happened in Nordic countries:
those countries have long been known for their extensive and progressive
family policies and the gender earnings gap in Nordic countries is one of the
smallest among industrialized countries (Blau and Kahn, 1992; Harkness and
Waldfogel, 2003). This fact illuminates a potentially important role for family
policies in reducing, and possibly eliminating, the gender gap that exists
in the labor market. Although there may be other contributing factors,11
we argue that extensive family policies are quite an effective way to reduce
the gender earnings gap, and our model provides a plausible framework to
understand this important connection.
While our primary focus is on welfare and policy implications, the present
paper also raises several theoretical issues that set it apart from the existing
literature. In our model, the interactions of three contributing factors—
assortative matching, intrahousehold bargaining and the asymmetric cost
structure—are crucial in giving rise to the distorted system of incentives.
Competition in the matching market (assortative matching) typically has a
positive incentive effect because agents have stronger incentives to invest,
in general, when they have concerns about their future matching partners.
The presence of intrahousehold bargaining by itself provides an additional
incentive, compared to the case where the total income of a household is
pooled and equally shared among its members, because agents can raise
their threat points by acquiring skills.12 However, when these two factors
11For instance, Milgrom et al. (2001) argued that the gender earnings gap in Sweden
narrowed almost a decade before the passage of family legislation, indicating that there are
other crucial factors at work. Blau and Kahn (2003) argued that the collective bargaining
convention and the minimum wage laws significantly influence the international differences
in the gender earnings gap.
12The models of Echevarria and Merlo (1999), Konrad and Lommerud (2000), Lundberg
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are combined with the fact that women possess a comparative advantage
in domestic activities, they are turned into negative incentives that lead
women to invest inefficiently in order to reduce their threat points and make
themselves more attractive in the marriage market. In this respect, our result
stands in strong contrast to the previous literature on ex ante investments
with intrahousehold bargaining where agents are homogeneous and hence
assortative matching is not an issue.
Several models incorporate competition for matching partners where in-
vestment decisions explicitly affect the type of matching partner (Cole et al.,
2001a, 2001b; Peters and Siow, 2002; Burdett and Coles, 2001; Chiappori et
al., 2006; Iyigun and Walsh, 2007b). In particular, Peters and Siow (2002)
revealed that competition in the marriage market is instrumental in resolv-
ing the holdup problem, as investment is accompanied by the upgrading of
marriage partners and this provides an additional incentive to invest. They
argued that this matching concern leads to an efficient allocation under cer-
tain conditions.13 The basic structure of our model builds on that of Peters
and Siow, but we show that competition in the marriage market can be the
source of a different type of inefficiency, as discussed above.14 Burdett and
Coles (2001), on the other hand, studied a holdup problem that includes
search frictions in finding matching partners. When an individual can find
another partner in a short time, he/she is more inclined to reject an unde-
sirable current partner. This matching concern provides too much incentive
to invest and may lead to inefficient overinvestment. Chiappori et al. (2006)
analyzed the problem of premarital investments with a different focus, il-
lustrating why women now attain higher education levels than men. Their
model is based on the presumption that binding agreements can be made
on the division of the marriage surplus and that this feature ensures that
the consequent equilibrium allocations are efficient. In contrast, we focus
more on the fact that marriage contracts are naturally incomplete and that
this incompleteness distorts women’s behavior, thereby leading to inefficient
allocations under some conditions.
A number of theoretical models have shown that individuals may acquire
and Pollak (2003) and Ishida (2003) share this feature.
13It has also been pointed out that in the context of the competitive marriage market
where agents compete for marital partners, standard models are no longer capable of
replicating the strongly asymmetric pattern of skill acquisition between men and women
(Rios-Rull and Sanchez-Marcos, 2002).
14Nosaka (2007) showed another source of inefficiency that arises when the utility is
submodular. In this case, the negatively assortative matching is more efficient, but the
competition effect prevents this matching formation.
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unproductive attributes.15 Of these studies, Cole et al. (1992, 1998) and
Mailath and Postlewaite (2006) come closest in spirit to ours. They presented
models in which individuals prefer to marry partners with a specific social
status that is unrelated to productivity because the acquisition of such a
social status improves the matching partners of their offspring. However,
the underlying mechanisms of those models differ totally from ours: the
matching concern provides an incentive, distorted through the process of
intrahousehold bargaining, to deliberately degrade the quality of investment
in our model, whereas this effect is absent in theirs. This difference proves
to be crucial, ultimately leading to different welfare and policy implications,
which are at the core of this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines
the model. Section 3 illustrates the driving force of our model, the trade-off
between the marriage and labor markets. Section 4 characterizes equilib-
ria and shows that two distinct types of equilibrium arise, asymmetric and
symmetric, depending on the relative cost of domestic activities. Section 5
discusses key properties of the model, given the results obtained in the pre-
vious section. In particular, we argue that the investment pattern of women
tends to be inefficient in the asymmetric equilibrium and we offer a potential
remedy for it. Finally, Section 6 makes some concluding remarks.
2 The model
2.1 Environment
There is a continuum of agents who belong to either one of the two gender
subsets, each denoted by j ∈ {f,m} (j = f for female and j = m for
male), and the population size of each gender subset is nj. There are three
time periods. Agents acquire skills in the first period and search for marital
partners (among the opposite sex) in the second. If two agents decide to
marry, they form a household and bargain over the total surplus in the third
period.16 Marriage contracts are incomplete and the married parties must
15Some examples include signaling models where education may not improve workers’
skills (Spence, 1973), and overlapping generations models where money or other attributes
are virtually unproductive (Samuelson, 1958; Cozzi, 1998). However, in these models, the
matching concern is absent.
16Note that the marriage market closes after the second period, which rules out the
possibility of remarriage. In other words, we consider a situation where remarriage is
prohibitively costly, perhaps because of search costs, so that it is not in anyone’s best
interest to do so. Note that this assumption is made strictly to simplify the analysis, as
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bargain over the total surplus ex post.
Each agent is completely characterized by the ability type x ∈ X = [x, x]
and gender j ∈ {f,m}. The distribution of the ability type is denoted by
F (xj), which is independent of gender.
2.2 Skill acquisition
Agents can accumulate skills in two dimensions, the level ej(x) ∈ R+ and
the market value qj(x) ∈ {H,L}. We assume that agents choose between
two market values, high (qj = H) and low (qj = L), where H > L ≥ 0.
Let hj(x) = (qj(x), ej(x)) ∈ {H,L} × R+ denote the investment choice.
For notational simplicity, we sometimes write this as hj = (qj, ej) or simply
h = (q, e), wherever it is not confusing. In what follows, we refer to the skill
with high (low) market value as being marketable (nonmarketable).
The market value simply reflects differences in the nature of skills and
is totally independent of how difficult or costly it is to acquire these skills.
That is, given some ability type x, the cost of skill acquisition depends on the
investment level e but not on the market value q, and is denoted by C(e, x).17
2.3 Marriage and production
In the second period, each agent decides whether to enter the marriage mar-
ket, which is assumed to be competitive and stable: no matched pair has an
incentive to unilaterally dissolve the marriage in search for another partner.
The resulting matching pattern must be positively assortative according to
the attractiveness of agents to the potential marriage partners, which consists
of the level and market value of the skills.
If an agent decides to remain single, then the agent concentrates on mar-
ket activities. The total utility when an agent remains single is equal to the
market productivity, which is the product of the two elements, qe, regardless
of gender.
If an agent enters the marriage market and finds a partner, the two
matched agents form a household in the second period. The gains from
our main results can be obtained even in the presence of a remarriage market as long as
the probability of remarriage diminishes over time (after each divorce).
17We can easily extend the model to the case where it is less costly to acquire the non-
marketable skill. This modification does not alter our main result because it enhances
the possibility of the equilibrium occurring in which female agents obtain the nonmar-
ketable skill. We make this assumption to emphasize that female agents may select the
nonmarketable skill even when there is no cost advantage in acquiring such a skill. The
assumption is also instrumental in making our welfare implications more transparent.
7
Ishida and Nosaka: Gender Specialization of Skill Acquisition
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
marriage arise from the investment choices made in the first period. Con-
sider a household where the investment choice for the female agent is hf and
that for the male agent is hm. Then, we specify that the joint outcome for
this household is given by:
y(hf , hm) = (1 + α)
(
qmem + (1− θ)qfef + θδef
)
, θ ∈ (0, 1). (1)
The first term represents the contribution of the male agent who devotes
his time entirely to market activities. The second and third terms indicate
the contribution of the female agent who devotes a fraction θ of her time
to domestic activities in order to produce various household public goods,
such as children and a clean and tidy household. The parameter δ measures
the productivity of domestic activities and it does not depend on the market
value of skills qj. This captures the fact that in order to enrich married lives,
many different types of knowledge and skills are valuable, including those
that are less productive in the labor market. The market value of skills qj is
no longer appropriate to measure the impact of skills. We sometimes refer
to δ as the intrinsic value of skills, partly to contrast with the endogenously
chosen market value qj(x). Finally, the total market income is multiplied by
1 + α, where α > 0, to represent additional benefits of marriage. This term
arises as a result of the creation of public goods within a household because
some consumed goods may be non-rivalry.18
We let θ ∈ (0, 1). In other words, we assume that women tend to possess
a comparative advantage in domestic activities.19 As a consequence, their
market productivity is lower by assumption (Echevarria and Merlo, 1999).20
Although this is debatable, there are several ways to justify this. First and
foremost, only women can bear children. This gender difference lowers their
productivity in market activities in many ways. For instance, Corcoran and
Duncan (1979), Mincer and Ofek (1982), Cox (1984) and Lazear and Rosen
(1990) emphasized the connection between career interruptions and earnings
growth for women. Moreover, Echevarria and Merlo (1999) constructed a
18Evidently, household public goods such as children and a clean and tidy household are
inherently non-rivalry and their benefits can be shared at little cost. Examples of private
goods that become (at least partially) non-rivalry within a household are consumer durable
goods such as refrigerators, TVs, telephones and so on.
19If each household endogenously decides which partner is to specialize in domestic
activities, the one whose skill has a lower market value would specialize in them. Then,
there arises the possibility of a gender role reversal in which some female agents invest in
the marketable skills substantially more than do male agents in order to work full time in
the labor market. We exclude this possibility for the reasons suggested in the main text.
20A similar assumption, that women bear the cost of child rearing more than do men,
is employed by Iyigun and Walsh (2007a).
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dynamic household bargaining model and showed that when the cost asso-
ciated with childbearing is positive, then, in equilibrium, women also bear
the entire cost associated with child rearing. In addition, there are many
works that provide mechanisms through which gender differences arise en-
dogenously from ex ante identical agents. See, among others, Francois (1998),
Bjerk and Han (2006) and Lommerud and Vagstad (2000). In any event, it is
natural that women devote more resources to domestic activities. Note that
θ represents the opportunity cost of marriage for female agents, which leads
to the earnings gap with respect to the marital status.
2.4 Intrahousehold bargaining
Because the private good is transferable, the agents in a household negotiate
over how to divide the total surplus in the third period. In the absence of
complete marriage contracts, the outcome of the negotiation is characterized
by the Nash bargaining solution. The threat point for each agent is the total
utility when the agent remains single, which is simply given by the skill level
in the market (note that there is no household public good in this case).21
The formula for the Nash solution that produces the bargaining outcome
Vj(hf , hm) for each agent as a function of the investment choices is:
Vj(hf , hm) =
1
2
(
y(hf , hm)− qfef − qmem
)
+ qjej,
=
α
2
qmem +∆(qf )ef + qjej, (2)
where,
∆(qf ) ≡ 1
2
[(
α− (1 + α)θ
)
qf + (1 + α)θδ
]
.
The marginal gain from ef is influenced by ∆(qf ), which in turn depends on
the market value of the acquired skill.
The use of Nash bargaining that explicitly introduces the agents’ threat
points into intrahousehold bargaining is critical. Besides the fact that it
is relatively common in applied works, we would like to point out two de-
sirable properties. First, empirical studies indicate that bargaining power
clearly matters in the final allocation of household resources (Thomas, 1990;
Browning et al., 1994; Chiappori et al., 2002). In this sense, Nash bargain-
ing is more consistent than other nonstrategic sharing rules that preclude the
21In other words, we view the ultimate threat point of intrahousehold bargaining as a
divorce. An alternative approach is to view it as a noncooperative marriage. See Lundberg
and Pollak (1993, 1994) for this approach.
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presence of threat points. Second, Nash bargaining leads to ex post efficient
allocations and it is reasonable for a couple to use it as a way to divide the
surplus.
3 The trade-off
This section illustrates the trade-off between the marriage and labor markets.
We modify (2) as follows:
Vf (hf , hm) = am(hm) +
(
qf +∆(qf )
)
ef , (3)
Vm(hf , hm) = af (hf ) + (1 +
α
2
)qmem, (4)
where aj is what we call “attractiveness,” defined as:
af = ∆(qf )ef , (5)
am =
α
2
qmem. (6)
Attractiveness represents the gross benefit that an agent can provide to the
marital partner. Thus, the preferences for marital partners are entirely sum-
marized by this scalar aj. More attractive agents are more desirable as
marital partners.
There are two critical implications of the preferences for marital partners.
First, female agents always prefer male agents with the marketable skill.
While agents with the marketable skill have stronger bargaining powers, this
negative effect is totally dominated by their higher income because they can
devote all of their resources to market activities. As a consequence, male
agents always choose to acquire the marketable skill in equilibrium, and we
can set qm = H.
An increase in the market value of skills, on the other hand, may or may
not increase the attractiveness of female agents. The deciding factor is the
fraction of time required to sustain a household relative to α. Under some
conditions, a serious trade-off arises for female agents where they actually
reduce their attractiveness by acquiring the marketable skill.
Proposition 1 Female agents with the marketable skill are less preferred by
male agents for any given investment level ef , i.e., ∆(L) > ∆(H), if
α
1 + α
< θ.
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Proof. One simply needs to derive a condition for ∆(L) > ∆(H), which
can be written as:(
α− (1 + α)θ
)
L+ (1 + α)θδ >
(
α− (1 + α)θ
)
H + (1 + α)θδ. (7)
Rearranging this yields the result. Q.E.D.
When this condition holds, female agents are not sufficiently productive in
the labor market because they need to spend a significant fraction of time on
domestic activities once they are married. As they cannot fully utilize their
acquired skill, their bargaining power is perceived to be excessively strong
from the viewpoint of male agents. This fact gives rise to a serious trade-off
for female agents: while they can raise their wages in the labor market by
acquiring the marketable skill, it could actually work to their disadvantage
in the marriage market because their threat points are now simply too high.
Because of this trade-off, an incentive may arise for them to intentionally
degrade the marketable skill and acquire the nonmarketable skill in order to
secure the benefit of marriage.
4 Equilibrium
Given the trade-off between the two markets of our interest, it is intuitively
clear that some sort of “gender asymmetry” could arise in a qualitative sense.
However, the exact form of the equilibrium depends crucially on the minute
details of the model structure and we need to add more assumptions to the
basic model to fully characterize the equilibria. As it is more of a technical
problem to characterize how agents behave in equilibrium, which by itself
does not yield much economic insight, we focus on cases that are relatively
tractable to illustrate the gist of the model. Obviously, similar conclusions
can be obtained in other specifications as long as the trade-off described in
the previous section is present, although it is simply not tractable in many
cases.
The basic model needs to be more tightly specified to precisely charac-
terize the equilibria. First, we make the following assumption concerning the
ability distribution and the population size:
Assumption 1 F (xj) is twice continuously differentiable and strictly in-
creasing in xj ∈ X. In addition, the female population is smaller than the
male population, i.e., nf < nm.
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The latter part of the assumption, that the female population is smaller in
size than the male population, is made strictly to ease computation and has
no qualitative impact: note that nf needs to be smaller than nm only by
an arbitrarily slight margin. We focus on this case in order to emphasize
that female agents indeed choose to acquire the nonmarketable skill even
when their bargaining power is inherently strong (because female agents are
scarce). We can obtain similar results when the male population is smaller
as long as the difference between nf and nm is small.
22
We assume the following fairly standard conditions on the cost function:
Assumption 2 C is twice continuously differentiable. In addition, for x ∈
X:
C(0, x) =
∂
∂e
C(0, x) = 0, lim
e→+∞
∂
∂e
C(e, x) = lim
x→0
∂
∂e
C(e, x) = +∞.
∂
∂e
C(e, x) > 0,
∂
∂x
C(e, x) < 0,
∂2
∂e2
C(e, x) > 0,
∂2
∂e ∂x
C(e, x) < 0,
for e > 0.
Finally, we place some restrictions on the range of the parameter values
in order to reduce the number of cases we need to consider:
Assumption 3 L+∆(L) > (1− α
2
)H.
This assumption says that the value of marriage is sufficiently large so that
all agents actually have an incentive to marry.23
4.1 Matching functions and equilibrium conditions
In what follows, we restrict our attention to the case where the equilibrium
matching pattern is positively assortative in the sense that the male and
female agents with the highest abilities are married to each other, the agents
22A nontrivial difference arises for female agents who remain single in equilibrium when
the male population is smaller in size. As they do not enter the marriage market, they
have no incentive to acquire the nonmarketable skill to raise their attractiveness. This
implies that single female agents always acquire the marketable skill, although married
female agents acquire the nonmarketable skill in some equilibria.
23The assumption ensures that marriage is preferable in equilibrium even if female agents
acquire the nonmarketable skill. Note, on the other hand, that male agents always choose
to marry whenever it is feasible to do so. As male agents always acquire the marketable
skill in equilibrium, it follows from (4) that the marginal benefit of investment (em) for
male agents is at least (1 + α/2)H when they are married, whereas it is H when they
remain single.
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with the next highest abilities are married to each other, and so on. Thus, we
introduce a function τ : X → X that indicates the matching pattern under
positive assortative mating:
xf = τ(xm).
This function τ must satisfy:
nf (1− F (τ(xm))) = nm(1− F (xm)) for xm ∈ [xc, x] ≡ Xm,
where xc is the least ability level among married male agents under the
positive assortative mating, i.e., nf = nm(1 − F (xc)). Male agents with
abilities below this threshold xc remain single.
For the analysis, it is often useful to introduce the cost function of a
matched pair. In terms of the function τ , we redefine the cost functions as
follows:
Cm(e, x) = C(e, x) for x ∈ X, Cf (e, x) = C(e, τ(x)) for x ∈ Xm,
where x indicates the ability type of the male agent in the household. In the
following analysis, we denote each household by the ability type of the male
agent.
In addition, we redefine the utility function for each agent in terms of aj,
instead of ej as in (3) and (4). From the definitions of aj in (5) and (6) that
implicitly determine ej = ej(aj, qj), the utility functions can be represented
as:
Uf (af , am, qf , x) ≡ Vf
(
ef (af , qf ), qf , em(am, qm), qm
)
− Cf
(
ef (af , qf ), x
)
,
= am +
(
qf +∆(qf )
)
ef (af , qf )− Cf
(
ef (af , qf ), x
)
, (8)
Um(af , am, qm, x) ≡ Vm
(
ef (af , qf ), qf , em(am, qm), qm
)
− Cm
(
em(am, qm), x
)
,
= af + (1 +
α
2
)qmem(am, qm)− Cm
(
em(am, qm), x
)
, (9)
where we impose the assumption that qm = H, as male agents always acquire
the marketable skill in equilibrium.
Now, let φ : R → R+ denote a matching function where φ(af ) indi-
cates the attractiveness of the male agent with which each female agent with
attractiveness af expects to match. The equilibrium matching pattern is
completely described by this matching function.24 In order for the match to
24Although the characteristics of agents are two dimensional (qj and ej), we can still
take this approach because the preferences of agents are summarized by the scalar variable
aj .
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be stable, the matching function φ must be a strictly increasing function of
af .
25
The equilibrium allocation consists of the optimal investment choices
(aj(x), qj(x)) for x ∈ X and a matching function φ. We are now ready
to derive the conditions that need to be satisfied in any equilibrium. First,
optimality implies that the following condition must be satisfied for married
agents:
(aej(x), q
e
j (x)) = argmaxaj ,qj
Uj(af , am, qj, x), (10)
s.t. am = φ(af ), for x ∈ Xm.
Let U ej (x) denote the equilibrium value of marriage (the expected utility
when married).
Second, as the matching pattern is positively assortative, all male agents
whose ability is lower than the threshold xc are unable to marry in equilib-
rium. The problem for those agents is defined as:
(esj(x), q
s
j (x)) = argmaxej ,qj
qjej − Cj(ej, x), (11)
for male agents with x ∈ X\Xm.
Clearly, all male agents who remain single choose to acquire the marketable
skill. We define Sj(x) for x ∈ X as the expected utility when single. Then,
the male agent at the threshold xc must be indifferent between marrying and
staying single:
U em(x
c) = Sm(x
c). (12)
In what follows, we refer to this agent at the threshold xc as the boundary
agent.
The above conditions along with a consistent matching function fully
characterize the equilibrium allocation, but the nature of equilibrium differs
markedly according to the market value of skills chosen by female agents
qf (x). While there are many possible equilibria such as (partially) pooling
equilibria, we focus on two of the most illuminating separating equilibria in
the next two subsections.26
25When the slope of the matching function is negative over some range, we can find a
pair (a1f , a
2
f ) such that a
1
f < a
2
f and φ(a
1
f ) > φ(a
2
f ). Then, the female agent with a
2
f and
the male agent with φ(a1f ) would be made better off by changing their currently assigned
partners and marrying each other. This violates the requirement of stable matching, which
is that no pair has an incentive to unilaterally dissolve the match.
26In general, we cannot rule out the possibility of partial pooling where a subset of
agents choose the same investment levels. We do not pursue this possibility as it is clearly
out of the scope of the paper.
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Figure 1: A symmetric equilibrium
4.2 Symmetric equilibrium
First, we consider a situation where all agents choose to acquire the mar-
ketable skill. This type of equilibrium could emerge when the condition in
Proposition 1 fails to hold, i.e., α/(1 + α) > θ, and, hence, ∆(H) > ∆(L) >
0.27 In this case, attractiveness is strictly increasing in the market value of
skills for both gender subsets, and, hence, there exists no trade-off between
the marriage and labor markets. As the marketable skill is unambiguously
the preferred choice for all agents, qf (x) = qm(x) = H for all x ∈ X, and the
problem is greatly simplified. As all agents in both gender subsets choose
the identical market value, we call it the symmetric equilibrium, and its
allocation is denoted by (asymf (x), a
sym
m (x)).
The symmetric equilibrium is essentially a variant of standard models
such as that of Peters and Siow (2002) and it is relatively straightforward
to characterize. The intuition behind the symmetric equilibrium can be best
seen graphically, as in Figure 1. The first equilibrium condition (10) dic-
tates that an agent with x chooses a point (asymf (x), a
sym
m (x)) that maximizes
27It is clear that ∆(qf ) > 0 when the condition in Proposition 1 does not hold.
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the utility on the matching function φ. As a result, the indifference curve
that provides an equilibrium utility U ej (x) is tangent to this matching func-
tion, and this provides the condition that the slope of the matching function
must satisfy. The second equilibrium condition (12) imposes a restriction
on the utility level of the boundary agent (the male agent at the threshold)
and this determines his equilibrium level of attractiveness and consequently
the investment level. As we now have the slope and the initial value of the
matching function, we can solve its differential equation. Under the main-
tained assumptions, the following proposition can be obtained.
Proposition 2 (Symmetric equilibrium) Under Assumptions 1–3, there
exists a symmetric equilibrium where all agents choose to acquire the mar-
ketable skill if ∆(H) > ∆(L).
Proof. See Appendix.
4.3 Asymmetric equilibrium
Now, we turn to a more interesting situation where the condition in Propo-
sition 1 holds and thus ∆(H) < ∆(L). Then, female agents face a trade-off
between the marriage and labor markets. This trade-off may lead to the
emergence of an asymmetric equilibrium where female agents deliberately
acquire the nonmarketable skill even though the cost of skill acquisition is
totally independent of the market value. In particular, we seek a type of
equilibrium where qf (x) = L for x ∈ Xm. We refer to this as the asymmetric
equilibrium, and its allocation is denoted by (aasymf (x), a
asym
m (x)).
The asymmetric equilibrium is more complicated. Here, we focus our
attention on a case where ∆(L) > 0 > ∆(H); we extend the analysis to
the case where ∆(L) > ∆(H) > 0 in Section 5.3. Under this condition, we
impose some additional conditions to characterize an asymmetric equilibrium
in a tractable way:
Assumption 4 (Cost function) For all (e, x) ∈ R+ ×X,
e
C(e, x)
∂ C(e, x)
∂ e
≡ γ(e, x) < 1 + −∆(H)
H +∆(H)
α
2 + α
.
Note that γ is the elasticity of the cost function with respect to the invest-
ment level e and that Assumption 4 places an upper bound upon it. As the
elasticity measures how much the investment costs, the assumption means
that the investment is not very costly. Under the maintained assumptions,
we have:
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Figure 2: An asymmetric equilibrium
Proposition 3 (Asymmetric equilibrium) Under Assumptions 1–4,
there exists an asymmetric equilibrium where all female agents choose to
acquire the nonmarketable skill if ∆(L) > 0 > ∆(H).
Proof. See Appendix.
The proposition establishes a sufficient condition for a type of asymmetric
equilibrium where qf (x) = L for x ∈ Xm. Figure 2 graphically illustrates this
situation. Note that, in the figure, male agents have an identical indifference
curve to that in Figure 1, but the situation is different for female agents.
Given that ∆(L) > ∆(H), female agents face a trade-off; an increase in
the market value leads to a decrease in attractiveness. Under this situation,
there are generally two distinct options the female agents can take. One is
to acquire the marketable skill, thereby increasing their market productivity,
but at the expense of becoming less attractive. The indifference curve in this
case is depicted as BB′ in Figure 2, where af takes a negative value. This
could happen if an increase in wages (earned in the labor market) is large
enough to compensate for the loss in the marriage market. The other is to
acquire the nonmarketable skill, thereby becoming more attractive, but at the
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expense of a decrease in market productivity. In Figure 2, the corresponding
indifference curve is depicted as AA′, where the domain of af is positive.
The asymmetric equilibrium arises when a positive value of attractiveness is
chosen by female agents, as depicted in the figure. In this case, female agents
choose the nonmarketable skill even if the acquisition of the marketable skill
is a viable option. Provided that the cost of skill acquisition is independent of
the market value, this incentive entails a welfare loss. This fact leaves room
for some government interventions, which will be discussed later in Section
5.2.
The results obtained thus far suggest that the equilibrium matching pat-
tern can change drastically as the parameters change. Consider the effect
of an improvement in the productivity of the household public goods, which
can be seen as a reduction in θ. Apparently, a change in θ has a signifi-
cant impact on the relative location of ∆(H) and ∆(L), and, hence, on the
resulting equilibrium pattern. An improvement in the productivity of the
household public goods allows female agents to shift their endowed resources
more heavily toward market activities and thereby reduces the earnings dif-
ferential with respect to the marital status. At some point, an investment
in the market value of skills becomes sufficiently profitable for female agents
and this leads to the emergence of the symmetric equilibrium. In the US, for
instance, there has been a steady increase in the proportion of female college
students choosing high-income majors such as engineering and business. The
model’s prediction is largely consistent with this recent trend.
As a final point, it should be noted that Assumption 4 only presents
a sufficient condition and that the asymmetric equilibrium may still exist
even without it. However, when Assumption 4 fails to hold, another type
of equilibrium where female agents choose the marketable skill may also
emerge. Suppose that Assumption 4 does not hold and that investment is
now more costly. In this case, the equilibrium investment level is lower and
more compressed. That makes male agents more homogenous in terms of
market productivity and consequently decreases the relative importance of
the marriage market, with the matching function becoming flatter. As the
loss in the marriage market can be compensated for easily by an increase in
the market income, this provides female agents with a stronger incentive to
deviate from the asymmetric equilibrium and acquire the marketable skill.
Therefore, when Assumption 4 fails to hold, it is actually feasible to have an
equilibrium where the matching pattern is negatively assortative.28 However,
28To understand this, note first that stable matching requires that the slope of the
matching function be positive. As female agents with higher ability invest more in any
18
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 7 [2007], Iss. 1 (Advances), Art. 61
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/vol7/iss1/art61
DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.1817
we do not pursue this possibility any further as this type of equilibrium is
not empirically prevalent, although it is certainly theoretically interesting.
5 Discussion
5.1 Welfare
The fact that female agents may choose to acquire the nonmarketable skill
yields a serious welfare implication. In our model setup, social efficiency
requires that qj(x) = H for all x because the cost of skill acquisition is inde-
pendent of the market value, whereas the intrinsic value δ is identical across
the two types of skills. In other words, our model depicts a situation where
everyone should specialize in the marketable skill for efficiency. Needless to
say, our point is not to insist that everyone should specialize in high-income
majors, such as business and engineering, because the social value of skills
cannot be measured solely by their market value: there are certain skills that
cannot be sold at higher prices in the labor market, yet they benefit society
in both tangible and intangible ways.29 Rather, our aim is simply to point
out that there exists a structural factor that tends to distort incentives for
women: as a result, the incentive to acquire the nonmarketable skill arises
independently of its intrinsic value δ.
Now, we investigate the efficient allocation of the economy in order to
derive some welfare implications. The social planner’s problem is fairly sim-
ple: as all terms are linear under the current setup, the efficient allocation
is achieved if and only if each agent’s contribution to the social welfare is
maximized. First, it can immediately be observed that the planner always
chooses the marketable skill to maximize its market value. Given this ob-
servation, the planner’s problem is defined as finding eoptj (x), j = f,m, such
that:
eoptf (x) = argmaxe (1 + α)
(
(1− θ)H + θδ
)
e− Cf (e, x), (13)
eoptm (x) = argmaxe (1 + α)He− Cm(e, x), (14)
separating equilibrium, their attractiveness af is lower, with ∆(H) being negative. As a
consequence, negatively assortative matching could emerge in some equilibria.
29To pursue this point further, our model does not consider the social value of skills
nor individual differences in tastes and aptitudes. The latter part is especially important
because the relative cost between the two types of skills should vary in a horizontal way
across individuals. We ignore this “horizontal individual heterogeneity” to emphatically
make our conclusion that even female agents who possess comparative advantage in the
marketable skill would acquire the nonmarketable skill.
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for married agents with x ≥ xc. Under the maintained assumptions, the
optimal investment levels are interior and, therefore, the first-order condi-
tion characterizes the efficient allocation of the investment levels, denoted
by eoptj (x). The next proposition characterizes the efficient allocation of the
economy (proof omitted).
Proposition 4 (Efficiency) In the efficient allocation, male agents marry
if x ≥ xc. All agents acquire the marketable skill in the efficient allocation
and the investment levels of married agents are determined by eoptj (x) for
x ∈ Xm.
Note that our model includes premarital investments, and, therefore, has
a holdup property. In the standard holdup problem, the investment level
typically falls below its efficient level because concerned parties fail to take
potential partners’ benefits into consideration.30 However, this problem can
be alleviated substantially when agents compete for spouses: in a compet-
itive marriage market, there may arise an additional incentive to invest for
attracting potential partners. Further, Peters and Siow (2002) showed that
efficient allocation can be achieved even when the utility is nontransferable.
In our model with intrahousehold bargaining and transferable utility, this
competition effect influences the equilibrium allocation in different ways, de-
pending crucially on the relative magnitudes of ∆(H) and ∆(L). When
∆(L) > ∆(H), along with other auxiliary conditions, there is an asymmetric
equilibrium where female agents have an incentive to strategically degrade
the market value of skills. The competition effect is actually the source of
another type of inefficiency and fails to resolve the holdup problem.
5.2 Policy implications
The asymmetric equilibrium is inefficient in that female agents intentionally
degrade the market value of skills, owing to their fear of success, even though
the cost of skill acquisition is totally independent of the market value of the
skill. Our analysis reveals that a direct subsidy to encourage the acquisition
30In the literature on the holdup problem, there is a debate over whether exclusive
contracts foster relation-specific investment. For instance, De Meza and Selvaggi (2003)
recently argued that some firms would deliberately expose themselves to holdup by signing
exclusive contracts because these eliminate inefficient equilibria. However, the focus of this
strand of literature is clearly different from ours because it is on the incentive for ex post
investments. In contrast, agents in our model would reduce bargaining power through ex
ante investments in order to find better trading partners.
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of skills is not effective against this inefficiency. To see this, consider an
alternative specification of the cost function for female agents:
C˜f (e, x) = β
−1Cf (e, x), (15)
where β is a parameter to measure the cost of skill acquisition. Within
the current setup, a subsidy to encourage the acquisition of skills for female
agents can be seen as an increase in β, as defined in (15), possibly financed
by lump-sum taxes imposed on all agents. Apparently, an increase in β
could have some quantitative effects on the equilibrium investment levels,
even when the asymmetric equilibrium prevails. However, it is clear that the
nature of the equilibrium remains basically unchanged because the condition
in Proposition 1 is totally independent of it. That is, if the asymmetric
equilibrium prevails in the first place, the nonmarketable skill remains the
equilibrium investment choice for female agents, regardless of β.31
By the same logic, affirmative action programs or equal employment op-
portunity laws are equally ineffective unless they are specifically targeted at
married women. To see the effects of such policies, we modify the model so
that the market income is lower for female agents by design, possibly owing
to labor market discrimination. Now, we denote the market income as λiqiei,
i = m, f , where λm ≥ λf . Moreover, to simplify notation, let λm = 1 and
λf = λ. The bargaining outcome for male agents (4) is modified to:
Vm =
1
2
(
y(hf , hm)− λqfef − qmem
)
+ qmem,
= af + (1 +
α
2
)qmem, (16)
where af is now redefined as af = ∆(λqf )ef . The asymmetric equilibrium
exists when ∆(λL) > 0 > ∆(λH) under Assumptions 1–4, where qj is re-
placed by λqj. Next, we consider a policy intervention that raises λ to-
wards one, through, say, an affirmative action program. Even with this
improvement, the preferences of male agents are qualitatively unchanged, as
∆(λ′L) > ∆(λ′H) for any λ′ ∈ (λ, 1) when the condition in Proposition 1
holds. Moreover, when ∆(L) > 0, we can apply the same analysis as in
the change of β because ∆(λ′L) > ∆(L) > 0 > ∆(λH) > ∆(λ′H), for any
λ′ ∈ [λ, 1]. Therefore, the nature of the equilibrium is identical to that in
31This is, of course, when the increase in β is within some reasonable range. When β is
extremely large, female agents would choose not to marry because their potential marriage
partners are relatively less attractive to them.
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Proposition 3, and the asymmetric equilibrium exists as long as Assump-
tions 1–4 hold.32 In conclusion, such policy interventions fail to resolve the
inefficiency at its origin as these policies could benefit both single and mar-
ried agents proportionally, and, hence, the policy interventions are not at all
effective in narrowing the earnings gap.
The previous argument clearly indicates that the source of the inefficiency
lies in the earnings differential between single and married women. There-
fore, the key to the solution is to reduce θ by compensating married women
for the market income that they would have earned if they had not engaged
in domestic activities. In our model, a decrease in θ raises the value of
the marketable skill for married female agents without affecting their mar-
ket income when they remain single or, equivalently and more importantly,
without affecting their threat point in the bargaining process. This could
alter the equilibrium skill choice as the perverse incentive faced by women
diminishes. There is indeed a wide array of possible compensation programs
to achieve this goal: monetary transfers to compensate for the opportunity
cost of childbearing and child rearing through providing paid maternity leave,
childcare benefits (made proportional to beneficiaries’ potential earnings), or
subsidies to nursery schools can be simple and effective policy measures in
eliminating this inefficient outcome.
5.3 The intermediate case
Thus far, we have restricted our attention to two tractable cases, ∆(H) >
∆(L) and ∆(L) > 0 > ∆(H), in order to illustrate the gist of the model. A
plausible situation that has not been covered is ∆(L) > ∆(H) > 0, which
occurs when θ is in some intermediate range.33 Here, we briefly analyze this
intermediate case.
When ∆(L) > ∆(H) > 0, female agents can raise their attractiveness
by acquiring either type of skill, although the nonmarketable skill is more
effective in this regard. This means that female agents still face the same
trade-off: they can reap the benefit of marriage more effectively by acquiring
the nonmarketable skill but at the expense of earning less in the labor market.
As above, a deciding factor turns out to be the slope of the matching function,
32Clearly, this argument does not follow when ∆(λ′L) is negative or Assumptions 1–4
with qj replaced by λ′qj do not hold for some λ′ > λ.
33There is another possibility, that 0 > ∆(L) > ∆(H). As discussed at the end of the
last section, the matching pattern is negatively assortative in terms of x if a separating
equilibrium ever exists, as ∆(qf ) is negative. As this situation is unrealistic, we do not
pursue this case any further.
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which roughly measures the relative importance of the marriage market. For
instance, suppose that the slope is relatively steep, meaning that male agents
are more diverse and a unit increase in af results in a larger increase in
the attractiveness of the spouse. In this case, the gains from the marriage
market outweigh the gains from the labor market, and, hence, it is optimal for
female agents to choose the nonmarketable skill. More precisely, a sufficient
condition for the existence of the asymmetric (symmetric) equilibrium is:
φ′(af ) > (<)
2
(1 + α)θ − α − 1, for all af ∈ R+. (17)
See the Appendix for the derivation of this condition. By exactly the same
logic, the symmetric equilibrium exists if the slope is sufficiently flat.
As well as the slope of the matching function, the nature of the equilib-
rium depends again on the value of (1 + α)θ − α. Note that (1 + α)θ > α
when ∆(L) > ∆(H). If (1 + α)θ ≈ α, the symmetric equilibrium emerges
for any given matching function. As θ increases, the right-hand side of (17)
decreases and the condition for the asymmetric equilibrium is more likely to
hold. This argument confirms our intuition that the asymmetric (symmet-
ric) equilibrium is more likely when θ is relatively large (small). Although
one may need to specify the ability distribution and the cost function more
tightly to obtain more complete conditions in terms of exogenous variables,
we can say that the same basic mechanism is still at work.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides a model to account for the gender specialization of skill
acquisition when the marriage market is competitive. The key ingredients of
the model are the process of intrahousehold bargaining and the cost asym-
metry of domestic activities. We show that when the cost of domestic activ-
ities is asymmetrically placed on women, their investment pattern may be
distorted to gain advantages in the marriage market. This leads to the emer-
gence of an inefficient asymmetric equilibrium where the majority of women
intentionally degrade the market value of their acquired skills.
The model indicates that the inefficient asymmetric equilibrium arises
when the cost asymmetry of domestic activities is more significant. This
result offers a critical policy implication: the fundamental source of the gen-
der specialization of skill acquisition lies in the earnings gap between single
and married women, rather than that between men and women. Once mar-
ried, women devote more resources to domestic activities in order to reap
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the benefit of role specialization. This lowers the returns to marketable skills
when they are married, compared to if they had remained single. The model
indicates that an effective remedy for this is to correct the cost structure
of domestic activities so that ∆(H) > ∆(L) holds. A policy intervention
to redistribute the cost of domestic activities, which is initially concentrated
more heavily on married women, to all members of the economy, can be much
more effective than an intervention such as affirmative action, which directly
subsidizes the acquisition of marketable skills for women.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.
As noted in the main body of the text, there is no incentive to acquire the
nonmarketable skill in equilibrium when:
∆(H) > ∆(L)⇔ α
1 + α
> θ, (A.1)
and we can impose qj(x) = H for x ∈ X. Then, following Peters and Siow
(2002), we can characterize the equilibrium conditions (10), (11) and (12).
The first condition (10) provides a pair of first-order conditions for each
x ∈ [xc, x]: 34
0 =
d
d af
Uf (af , φ(af ), H, x),
= φ′(af ) +
[(
H +∆(H)
)
− ∂
∂ef
Cf
(
ef (af , H), x
)] 1
∆(H)
, (A.2)
0 =
d
d am
Um(φ
−1(am), am, H, x),
=
1
φ′(af )
+
[
(1 +
α
2
)H − ∂
∂em
Cm
(
em(am, H), x
)] 2
αH
. (A.3)
By substituting out x from the above equations, we have a unique differential
equation of the form: φ′(af ) = g(af , φ(af )) for some g, as (af , am) uniquely
determines φ′(af ) > 0 under our assumptions about the cost function.
The third condition (12) yields the utility level of the boundary male agent
at the threshold xc. From this condition and the above tangency condition,
34We note that the value of marriage is always larger than the value of staying single
for all agents in a symmetric equilibrium. In addition, the first-order conditions and an
increasing matching function are sufficient for optimality because of the single crossing
property of the utility function Uj , i.e., ∂2 Uj(af , am, qj , x)/(∂ x ∂ aj) > 0.
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the investment levels are determined by the following maximization problem
for the boundary agent:
(af (x
c), am(x
c)) = arg max
af ,am
Uf (af , am, H, x
c) (A.4)
s.t. Um(af , am, H, x
c) ≥ Sm(xc), aj ≥ 0.
The assumption about the cost function ensures the unique interior solution.
This provides the boundary condition of the differential equation: am(x
c) =
φ(af (x
c)). With this boundary condition and the differential equation, we
can obtain the matching function φ and the equilibrium choice of aj(x) for
x ∈ [xc, x].
Male agents below the threshold xc stay single in an equilibrium for which
the investment level is obtained by (11). The matching function φ below
af (x
c) should be determined so that it is optimal for these male agents to
stay single, as depicted in Figure 1, which completes the characterization of
the symmetric equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.
As we do not know which skill type is preferred by female agents, we follow
two steps in the proof of the proposition. First, we construct an asymmetric
equilibrium as if only the nonmarketable skill is available for female agents.
Second, we examine whether this choice is globally optimal even if the mar-
ketable skill becomes an available option.
In the first step, we suppose that all female agents choose the nonmar-
ketable skill, i.e., qf (x) = L. Then, we can follow the same procedure as in the
proof of Proposition 1. The first-order conditions and the boundary condi-
tion are unchanged with the exception that qf = L in the expression.
35 Male
agents below the threshold xc remain single in equilibrium and the investment
choice is identical to the case in the symmetric equilibrium. This completes
the construction of the equilibrium investment choice ej(x) in x ∈ X and the
matching function φ(af ) such that af ≥ af (xc).
In addition, it is necessary to show that all agents actually prefer to
marry. This fact is clear for male agents, as shown in footnote 23. In order
to investigate the case of female agents, we consider two cases depending
on whether easymf (x) ≤ esf (s), in which easymj (x) is the investment level in
the asymmetric equilibrium. First, when easymf (x) ≤ esf (x), the optimality
35Specifically, Uf (af , φ(af ),H, x) is replaced with Uf (af , φ(af ), L, x) in (A.2) and (A.4).
As in the case of the symmetric equilibrium, the first-order conditions are sufficient for
optimality.
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requires that female agents are not better off when they choose esf (x) and
marry. Letting Uasymf (x) be the equilibrium utility level when a female agent
chooses to marry, we have:
Uasymf (x) ≥ φ
(
∆(L)esf (x)
)
+ (L+∆(L))esf (x)− Cf (esf (x), x),
>
α
2
Hesf (x) + (L+∆(L))e
s
f (x)− Cf (esf (x), x) > Sf (x),
where we use the fact that φ(∆(L)esf (x)) ≥ φ(∆(L)easymf (x)) = aasymm (x) >
(α/2)Hesm(x) > (α/2)He
s
f (x)
36 in the second inequality, and Assumption 3
in the last inequality. Second, when easymf (x) > e
s
f (x), the direct application
of the envelope theorem reveals the following:
∂
∂ x
(
Uasymf (x)− Sf (x)
)
= −∂ Cf (e
asym
f (x), x)
∂ x
+
∂ Cf (e
s
f (x), x)
∂ x
,
= −
∫ easym
f
(x)
es
f
(x)
∂2Cf (ef , x)
∂ e ∂ x
d ef > 0. (A.5)
That implies that Uasymf (x
′) − Sf (x′) > Uasymf (x) − Sf (x) for x′ > x if
easymf (x˜) > e
s
f (x˜) for all x˜ ∈ [x, x′]. When this inequality does not hold
for some low value of x˜, then we can apply the result of the first case and
show that Uasymf (x)−Sf (x) > Uasymf (x˜)−Sf (x˜) > 0 for all x ≥ x˜. Otherwise,
Uasymf (x) − Sf (x) > Uasymf (xc) − Sf (xc) where xc is the ability level of the
boundary agent. As the boundary female agent is clearly better off when
married,37 the last expression is positive.
In the second step, we examine whether this potential equilibrium is in-
deed optimal even if female agents can choose the marketable skill. When
the marketable skill is available, female agents may choose a negative value
of af (by acquiring the marketable skill), and, thus, we need to show that
it is not a profitable choice for them for this range of af . As illustrated in
Figure 2, the conditions for “no profitable deviation” require that the match-
ing function φ should pass between the two indifference curves that yield the
equilibrium utility levels. To see this, we first examine the indifference curves
of male agents and then those of female agents.
The case of male agents: There are two types of male agents, depending
on whether the ability type is above or below the threshold xc. We show that
it is enough to restrict attention to that of the boundary agent.
36Note that xm > τ(xm) owing to the fact that nf < nm. This implies that the
ability of the female agent is lower than that of the male agent for any married pair, and,
consequently, that esm(x) > e
s
f (x).
37We can confirm this fact by substituting (ef , em) = (esf (x
c), esm(x
c)) and (qf , qm) =
(L,H) into the maximization problem of (A.4). Then, Assumption 3 ensures the result.
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First, consider male agents whose ability is above the threshold xc. When
female agents choose a negative value of af , the level of the attractiveness
necessary for male agents to marry these female agents, φ(am), is lower than
any equilibrium levels of am. It can be shown that male agents never choose
such a low level of am when the boundary agent does not prefer it. In
order to confirm this, we consider the two choices of am and am(x
c), where
am < am(x
c). Then, we have the following relation because of the super-
modularity of Um(φ
−1(am), am, H, x) with respect to (am, x):
Uasymm (x)− Um(φ−1(am), am, H, x)
≥ Um(φ−1(am(xc)), am(xc), H, x)− Um(φ−1(am), am, H, x),
> Uasymm (x
c)− Um(φ−1(am), am, H, xc), for x > xc.
Hence, male agents whose ability is above xc never choose this low level of
am when the boundary male agent does not prefer it. As a consequence, it is
enough to focus on the boundary agent in order to investigate if male agents
whose ability is above xc never prefer a negative value of af .
Now, consider male agents whose ability is below the threshold xc. It is
necessary to establish that they do not prefer marriage given the matching
function of φ(af ). First, it is noted that U
asym
m (x) − Sm(x) is an increasing
function of x, following the same logic as in (A.5), because easymm (x) > e
s
m(x).
This implies that Uasymm (x) < Sm(x) below x
c because the boundary male
agent is indifferent. Therefore, it is sufficient to focus on the boundary agent
in order to check the consistency of the matching function.
The case of female agents: Now, we consider female agents. As we have
already seen that it is sufficient to consider the boundary agent in the case
of male agents, we simply need to derive the condition for the existence of
a matching function that passes between the indifference curve of any given
female agent and that of the boundary male agent for af < 0.
In order to pin down a consistent matching function, the indifference
curves of female agents and the boundary male agent must move away from
each other. A sufficient condition is that the slope of the indifference curve
of the female agent when af is zero (one example is given at B
′ in Figure
2) is flatter than that of the boundary male agent (C). We will derive this
condition explicitly.
The indifference curves in Figure 2 are characterized by a set of (af , am)
that keeps the utility levels identical to the equilibrium ones:
Sm(x
c) = Um(af , am, H, x
c), for boundary male agents,
Uasymf (x) = Uf (af , am, H, x), (A.6)
for female agents who acquire marketable skills.
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The slopes of the indifference curves when af = 0, denoted by Slopej (j =
f,m), are obtained from the total differentiation of the above equations.
From the definitions of utilities, (8) and (9), we have:
Slopef =
H +∆(H)
−∆(H) > 0, (A.7)
(Slopem)
−1 =
2
αH
(
−(1 + α
2
)H +
∂
∂ em
Cm
(
em(a
0
m, H), x
c
))
,
where a0m satisfies the condition that S
s
m(x
c) = Um(0, a
0
m, H, x
c). To derive
a simple condition, we introduce a1m > 0 such that 0 = Um(0, a
1
m, H, x
c).
Then, it is clear that a1m > a
0
m because of the strict concavity of Um with
respect to am. This specific value provides the lower bound for the slope of
the indifference curve:38
(Slopem)
−1 <
2
αH
(
−(1 + α
2
)H +
∂
∂ em
Cm
(
em(a
1
m, H), x
c
))
,
= (
2
α
+ 1)
(
γ(em(a
1
m, H), x
c)− 1
)
. (A.8)
By comparing (A.7) and (A.8), we can conclude that the slope of the indiffer-
ence curve is indeed steeper for the boundary male agent than for the bound-
ary female agent under Assumption 4. Therefore, the indifference curves of
male and female agents tend to move away from each other as the absolute
value of af rises, and we can draw a matching function that passes between
them for af < 0, as indicated by the bold curve in the figure. This completes
the proof that there exists an asymmetric equilibrium under the maintained
assumptions. Q.E.D.
The derivation of (17).
In this proof, we suppose that female agents choose to acquire the nonmar-
ketable skill and then check when there is no incentive to deviate from the
asymmetric equilibrium. The condition to support the symmetric equilib-
rium can be obtained by exactly the same logic.
Given that female agents acquire the nonmarketable skill, we end up with
some matching function φ(af ). Suppose that female agents are now allowed
to deviate by acquiring the marketable skill. It is not optimal to deviate this
way if their indifference curve (A.6) is always above the matching function,
38From the definition of a1m, ∂ Cm(em, x
c)/∂ em = (1 + α/2)Hγ(em, xc) when em =
em(a1m,H).
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a set of (af , am) available to female agents. In order to show that we can
effectively ignore the choice of the marketable skill for all female agents, we
construct the envelope of the indifference curves. The necessary conditions
for the envelope curve provide the following equations in which x works as a
shift parameter:39
af =
∆(H)
∆(L)
aasymf (x),
am = Uf (a
asym
f (x), a
asym
m (x), L, x)−
(
H +∆(H)
)
ef (af , H)
+Cf
(
ef (af , H), x
)
,
= aasymm (x) + (L+∆(L)−H −∆(H))ef (af , H).
When we substitute aasymj (x) out from the above conditions, we have the
following envelope, denoted as am = ξ(af ):
am = φ
(∆(L)
∆(H)
af
)
− (H +∆(H)− L−∆(L)) af
∆(H)
≡ ξ(af ).
As noted, a sufficient condition is that this envelope ξ(af ) is located above
the matching function φ(af ) for all af ∈ R+ (i.e., ξ(af ) > φ(af ) for all af ).
This leads to the next condition:
φ
(
∆(L)
∆(H)
af
)
− φ(af )
∆(L)
∆(H)
af − af
>
H +∆(H)− L−∆(L)
∆(L)−∆(H) =
2
(1 + α)θ − α − 1.
This inequality clearly holds when the slope of the matching function φ′(af )
is steeper than the value on the right-hand side for all af ∈ R+. Q.E.D.
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